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The fall of the Soviet Union prompted a vast amount of political change across the globe. A 
bipolar global power structure transformed into a unipolar diplomatic one. In the wake of 
this structural shift, the former Soviet Republics gained independence — along with all its 
merits and challenges. Great Powers were forced to reassess their relationships under new 
geopolitical conditions. Meanwhile, the newly formed Central Asian Republics were brought 
to the forefront of global attention. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Tajikistan’s developmental journey is not simply regionally significant, but also globally. 
Geographical, economic, and political factors make the region pivotal for the Great Powers. 
Faced with challenges like ethnic, religious, and political conflict; the Great Powers have 
competed to gain influence in the region. This competition has included both soft and hard 
power tactics. The scope of this paper is limited to three involved Great Powers in the region: 
Russia, China, and the United States. Their relationships with the Central Asian states are 
unique. The diversity of their foreign policy goals, capabilities, and challenges toward Central 
Asia paint a complex mosaic of international relations. Nevertheless, this analysis will clearly 
illustrate that these Great Powers have more opportunity for cooperation than just conflict. 
Keywords: Russian foreign policy, Central Asia, regional rivalry, global rivalry.
I. REGIONAL RIVALRY
Before addressing the global concerns, we must first discuss the regional realities. The 
international media has presented arguments, which explicitly or implicitly report about a 
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regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran in Central Asia. While such stories easily catch 
the eyes, they require closer non-partisan observation to examine the accuracy of such 
claims. In this brief section, we conduct an analysis of Turkish and Iranian policy priori-
ties in the region.
Turkey
The media reported that Turkey competed with both the Great Powers and Iran, as 
a regional power, in Central Asia. Ankara is supposedly done that to establish a symbolic 
level of influence in the region. This symbolic influence is applied to the soft power strate-
gies and ideological Turkic unity. However, Turkish foreign policy has economic interests 
in having a stable Central Asia and plays no further role than being a balancing power. 
Excluding the humanitarian tendencies towards undemocratic attitudes, such as Uzbeki-
stan’s policy in Andijan under Karimov’s rule, Turkey has been more involved with eco-
nomic outcomes. For Ankara, economic acquisitions, such as business initiations, benefit 
from energy, and natural sources, are built on good diplomatic relations with soft power 
and stability in the region. 
Turkish Foreign Policy Goals & Means
Aside of the global competition in the region, Turkey, as a regional power, has seen 
no harm to become another actor in trading, security, technology, education in Central 
Asia since 1991. Turkey was both familiar with the culture in the geography and the iden-
tity building process which the post-Soviet countries went through. In the last decade, 
Turkey played an active role in foreign policy in the region by calling out attention to the 
cultural and linguistic similarities [1]. Soft power has been important for Turkey, since 
it eased the domestic barriers in the region while building partnerships. The Ministry of 
Foreign Relations of Turkish Republic pursues soft power strategies culturally and mili-
tarily. The cultural vein of these strategies are executed by The Turkish Cooperation and 
Development Agency (TIKA). TIKA has also institutional ties with the Turkey Scholar-
ship Program and Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB). These 
governmental institutions are founded to reinforce the cultural ties between Turkey and 
Central Asian countries, provided scholarships to the students from the region, opened 
universities (that recently shut down in cooperation with the governments due to their re-
lations with Gulenists). Then this policy also covered different regions, mainly the Middle 
Eastern countries, Balkan and Sub-Saharan countries — addition to the developmental 
aids to those regions. Further initiations of cooperation between Turkey and the Cen-
tral Asian countries included Turkish Council (Türk Keneşi), TÜRKPA, TÜRKSOY. The 
aims of these partnerships have been promoting the cultural and economic cooperation. 
Particularly, TURKPA and TURKSOY, having founded by the suggestion of Nur Sultan 
Nazarbaev, reinforced the ideological approach of Turkish identity. 
Secondly, Turkey have had a military partnership with Central Asian countries un-
der the Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military status 
(TAKM) [2]. This partnership was to combat organized crime, terrorism, smuggling and 
radical groups. So it has neither been against any countries, nor any organizations. More-
over, it was even useful for Russia and the other great powers [3]. TAKM has never been 
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bothersome for Russia. Indeed, Russia promotes the safety of Central Asian region with 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization and some other structures as well [3]. 
Turkey calls Central Asian countries Turkic countries, assumes the power of being a 
secular model to those countries having the same linguistic and cultural roots [1]. These 
countries are marked as the relatives of Turkish entity, security of the rooted old and secu-
lar culture, predominantly pre-Islamic. Congruent with the public opinion and to some 
Pan-Turkist nationalists, the public opinion never felt out of it. However, Central Asian 
countries did not perceive Turkish people as antecedents obviously. Yet, Russia, as the 
leading power would let Turkey to have those cultural ties moderately, as growing radical 
Islam would be much more difficult to handle and would make impossible to Russia to 
have an influence in the region. 
The common interests of Turkey and Russia paved the way for cooperation between 
two powers while they are pursuing their own interests. However, one must consider the 
limitations of the power of this partnership, such as Turkey’s membership to NATO and 
the natural competition between the two. However, Turkey has taken Russia as an en-
dorsement for its both energy and cultural interests lately, by staying out of a real rivalry 
in Central Asia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey puts Afghanistan to the first place in 
the developmental cooperation under TIKA after the US intervention, and Africa comes 
the second [4]. As Turkish foreign policy’s priorities in terms of security has shifted to the 
Middle East with the respective instabilities in Iraq and Syria, Central Asian countries 
turned their faces to the Russian aids more. 
Iran
The media and certain policy-corners mentioned much about Iranian foreign policy 
ambition. The focus has been on the rhetoric coming from the Iranian leaders, especially 
in terms of exporting their revolutions. However, a quick observation of the record sim-
ply indicates that Iran has not succeeded in exporting its revolution to any Muslim state, 
even the Shia majority ones. In fact, Azerbaijan, with a Shia majority of Azeri ethnicity, 
has shown distaste for the Iranian style regime. Iraq, another Shia majority state, has es-
tablished a secular regime. In Lebanon, Iran has some influence with Hezbollah, but the 
political system is not in Iranian style. Moreover, the Shia populations in Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere are either run by secular regimes or political system that has 
no similarity at all to that of the Iran Islamic Republic.
Iranian Foreign Policy Goals & Means
In theory, Iran pursues a non-alignment and anti-hegemonic foreign policy, by which 
is instructed to support deprived masses in any country, particularly in Muslim ones. In 
practice, however, the Iranian leaders have shown willingness to negotiate with any coun-
try on equal basis without any pre-conditions. Moreover, they have not supported all de-
prived masses in all countries, including in Muslim state. One particular example of Iran’s 
pragmatic method, despite its Constitutional Principles and leadership rhetoric is that 
Iran has maintained close and friendly relationship with Armenia, despite the Armenian-
Azeri Conflict, where Armenians control lands claimed by the Muslim Azeries.
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In Central Asia, Tehran has not aimed to export its Islamic revolution or to support 
Islamic Radical groups, even though the many Central Asian nations have become recep-
tive to Islamic training after decade of Soviet system which banned religion. In fact, Iran 
has maintained cordial ties with all Central Asia leaders, with the exception of Islam Ka-
rimov who passed away. 
In the region, Tehran has followed a cooperative diplomatic, economic, and security 
relations. The diplomatic mission has focused on common cultural ties with the Central 
Asian, who celebrate many ancient Iranian holidays (such as the NeuRouz New Year) and 
event from the Persian Empire. 
In economic terms, there is a big gap between theory and practice. Theoretically, 
Iran could have geographically been the gateway for the international trade of all Central 
Asian states with the outside world. In fact, the trans-Central Asia railroad has been con-
nected with the trans-Iranian railroad for years. Thus, the products could move to and 
from Central Asia cities to the rest of the world and vice-versa via Iranian ports in the 
Persian Gulf. However, minor issues here and there have blocked this major economic 
option. Thus, there is limited movement of people and products between Iran and the 
Central Asian states, where you can find Iranian made good and some limited services 
offered throughout Central Asia. Moreover, there has been swapping of the oil and natural 
gas between Iran and Kazakhstan as well as between Tehran and Ashgabat. These were 
limited exchanges, so Iran has not become the gateway for the Central Asian fossil fuels 
for the rest of the world, despite the potential that exist there for such a trade.
In terms of security, both Iranian and Central Asians leaders are concerned about 
border security and smuggling activities. In practice, this area has been the most success-
ful aspect of cooperation between Iran and the Central Asian states at both bilateral and 
multilateral levels, including via the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) struc-
ture. As an observer, Iran even attends the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
meetings to coordinate its general policy directions. Using the challenging geographic fea-
tures of the region, however, the smugglers have maintained a thriving business of smug-
gling opium and people across the borders of Central Asian states and Iran, despite the 
death punishment by firing squad at the sites of arrest in Iran.
Based on the factors that we examined about Turkish and Iranian presences in Cen-
tral Asia, there is frankly no conflict of interests, ideologies, or strategies between the two 
so-called regional rivals. Thus, what is presented in most media outlet is for catching at-
tention based on very few facts. Thus, we should focus more on global rivalry among the 
Great Powers. 
Global Rivalry
The Great Powers are all interested in creating trade relationships with the Central 
Asian states. Competing for influence, they have used a variety of soft and hard power 
tactics to influence the region. Although concerns about instability are present, the Great 
Powers have continued to build relationships with these states since their creation. 
Establishing airbases was one of the first tactics employed by the US and Russia in 
the post 9/11 era. While this move might not have directly been to balance Russia in the 
region, the threat was felt. The US and Russia have installed military bases to physically 
project their influence and offer security to the hosting country in the wake the Afghan 
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war [5, p. 37]. However, only Russia has been successful in retaining and maintaining their 
bases [6, p. 84]. 
Another tactic has been employing public and private international organizations to 
gain influence such: as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of Russia, or the China Natural Petroleum Corpora-
tion (CNPC) of as a Chinese initiation [5, p. 37–38; 7]. 
Of course there is difference between desiring regional control of Central Asia and at-
taining it. Each Great Power has distinct capabilities and challenges. Although the United 
States, Russia, and China have vast soft and hard capabilities, there are looming mutual 
concerns about the stability of the region. The Great Powers must consider their aptitude 
of combatting radical groups, political instability, and drug trafficking. There is much to 
gain from the region due to its geopolitical attributes and natural resources. In order to 
benefit from Central Asia’s offerings, the Great Powers must consider their foreign policy 
goals, capabilities, and challenges. 
II. GLOBAL RIVALRY
Russian Federation
The collapse of the USSR prompted Russia to lose a significant amount of precious 
territory. Although Russia shares similar language, infrastructure, and economy with 
Central Asian states, their ability to be the hegemon of the region has been diminished 
greatly. Internal and external factors have lead Russia to compete with other Great Pow-
ers for influence in the region. Attracted to the geopolitical location and valuable natural 
resources, Russia is determined to gain power in the Central Asian region. 
Russian Foreign Policy Goals
Russian means for gaining regional hegemony include supporting authoritarian lead-
ers who are more willing to work with Moscow. Monopolizing energy trade routes would 
also grant greater influence in the region [8, p. 636]. Russia is concerned about the large 
number of ethnic Russians who inhabit the region and seasonally migrate for work. Pro-
tecting them and preventing the spread of radical Islam are prime objectives. Russia natu-
rally aims to decrease the influence of the US and China, so it may become the hegemon 
[8, p. 636]. Their policy towards achieving this goal includes sustaining instability. Alexey 
Malashenko from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace states:
Although the Kremlin has repeatedly stressed its commitment to stability, Russia 
nevertheless finds shaky situations more in its interests, as the inherent potential for local or 
regional conflict creates as highly convenient excuse for persuading the governments of the 
region to seek help from Russia in order to survive [9, p. 9]. 
The policy of perpetuating instability is akin to a divide and conquer strategy. Despite 
its merits, the same instability issues could eventually come back to haunt Moscow, if he-
gemony is achieved. Russia would essentially inherent the weakness, they have imposed. 
It would be in Russian best interest to quell the instability and act as an ally. Furthermore, 
international trade integration and Western military presence have created a delicate situ-
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ation in the region. Upsetting one of the existing characteristics could generate a larger 
problem with instability. Despite a common cultural identity, Russia is unable to offset 
the economic power of China and diplomatic skills of the US. Thus, Russia is unlikely to 
become regional hegemon any time soon.
Russian Concerns: Russia is also heavily concerned with the drug trade prevalent 
in the southern Central Asian states. Heroin trade from Afghanistan makes its way up 
through the region into Russian territory, where there exists rampant drug addiction and 
drug related deaths. With at least 1 million heroin addicted citizens and 30,000 drug re-
lated deaths a year, a stricter grasp on the region would allow Moscow to prevent the drug 
problem from worsening [10]. US and NATO forces have played an important role in the 
prevention of drug trade, which places Russia in an uncomfortable position. The with-
drawal of Western troops would allow Russia to have a dominant military presence, but 
worsen existing drug trade concerns [10]. The containment of the spread of radical Islam 
is another foreign policy goal for Russia. Once again, the withdrawal of NATO and US 
troops from the Middle East and Central Asia would leave a troublesome power vacuum. 
At the same time, Russia must appease and overcome Western influence in Central Asia if 
they desire to attain supreme regional influence [10]. 
Russian Capabilities
Moscow used soft and hard power tactics over the past decades to claim its stake in 
Central Asia. Russia has tried to dominate energy trade with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
since their formation [10]. At first, Russia held the most influence over the region’s natural 
resources. The USSR fall left these states with similar ethnic identity, language, and most 
importantly: infrastructure. Russia took advantage of this opportunity to gain oil and nat-
ural gas in the “near abroad” until competitive offers from the US and China presented 
themselves [7, p. 598].
Cultural Identities: Although the Central Asian states have a great degree of ethnic 
diversity, many of their citizens have Russian heritage. Slavic Russian population, once 
the majority, has become minorities in the newly independent states. Furthermore, many 
migrate back and forth for seasonal jobs [10]. Together with similar languages and preex-
isting shared infrastructure, Russia holds vital soft power capabilities. Russia could play 
the brother in the region, by relying on the linguistic advantages. Furthermore, Moscow 
cares about the Slavic-Orthodox minorities in Central Asian countries. On the other 
hand, Russia could use these capabilities in the international arena. Using these capa-
bilities in the international arena, Russians formed EurAsEc in 2000  with Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan [11, p. 5]. EurAsEc was the first step in forming an 
integrated economy similar to the European Union. It established joint programs for eco-
nomic, transportation, social, and scientific programs. Issues related to trade were able to 
be resolved through EurAsEc. It was internationally recognized by the United Nations in 
2003 [11, p. 6]. Although this IO had its successes towards creating an integrated Central 
Asia with Russia, it became clear some states were stronger than others. Furthermore, 
Russia’s strong ethnic identity with Central Asia has become dwarfed by a Chinese iden-
tity. In 2014, 6.7 million Russian were reported in the region while it is estimated that 
there is near 110 million Chinese [12, p. 485]. 
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Economic Influence: Russia’s role as primary trade partners has been shadowed by 
China’s excellent diplomatic and economic support. Outside actors have engaged in ener-
gy trade that has significantly diversified the region’s economic partners [9]. In attempting 
to become a dominant economic force, Russia has created several IO’s to form multilateral 
trade agreements like the EurAsEc Customs Union (CU) and the Single Economic Space 
(SEC) [11, p. 5]. 
In 2010, the CU was formed. It included Russia along with the best economies from 
EurAsEc: Belarus and Kazakhstan. A year after its creation, trade between the states in-
creased by 33.3 % [10, p. 6]. Encouraged by the success of the CU, the three states subse-
quently established SEC in 2012. Its goals include promoting the free movement of goods, 
capital services, and people. It was meant to be the next and final step before a fully inte-
grated Eurasian Union [11, p. 6–7]. 
Although the CU and SES have had a degree of success, it by no means has become 
the dominant economic force of the region. In 2011, 85.6 % of exports from Kazakhstan 
went to non-CIS states. Central Asia has found that Western states are oftentimes willing 
to pay more for their exports, therefore driving them to diversify their trade agreements 
[11, p. 9]. Furthermore, Russia has imposed higher tariffs within the SES, disadvantaging 
Kazakhstan and Belarus, especially in automobile trade. Despite slight inequity of trade 
agreements within SES, it still has good cause to exist. Russia and CIS states are heavily 
interrelated through labor and migration. An economic agreement is vital to assess their 
common goals [11, p. 10]. 
Physical Influence: As former USSR territory, Central Asian states still utilize Soviet 
military equipment. The region’s defense forces wield many outdated Soviet infrastruc-
ture, vehicles, and weapons [13, p. 206–232]. As of February, the IISS Military Balance has 
reported Russian foreign deployment in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia holds many 
military bases in Kyrgyzstan and one reported base in Tajikistan. There is also one Russian 
radar station in Balkhash, Kazakhstan [13, p. 206–232]. 
Moscow does not like the presence of NATO troops as competition in the region. 
However, they have benefited from US and NATO presence in Central Asia and the Mid-
dle East in dealing with the spread of drugs and radical Islam. Russia also benefits from 
China’s abilities to balance the Western powers. Consequently, it is near impossible for 
Russia to become the only physical force in Central Asia [10]. To deter NATO, Russia had 
employed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO is relatively 
weak as many member states engage in similar relations with China through the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. Uzbekistan, one of the wealthiest CIS states, begin to back out 
of CSTO after the ethnic clashes between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 2010. Kazakhstan is 
also inhabited by NATO troops through the Partnership for Peace program [14, p. 2–3]. 
It is highly unlikely that Russia will be able to achieve military prominence in the region 
given the current situation. 
Russian Challenges
Despite cultural, economic, and hard power capabilities, Russia has met several chal-
lenges in aiming to become regional hegemon. Their recent declining economy, regional 
instability, and the anti-hegemonic policy of the Central Asian states have withheld Russia 
from achieving their goals.
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Economic Limits: Russia’s goals to become regional hegemon face several obstacles. 
These factors are related to the economy, instability, CIS sovereignty concerns, and balanc-
ing Great Power’s interests. Since Russia’s economic crisis in the late 1990’s, their role as 
an attractive trade partner to the region’s states has been permanently damaged. Central 
Asian states have continued to diversify their trading partners, finding dealings with the 
West to be rather lucrative [10]. IO’s like EurAsEc and SES have had a degree of success, 
but are easily dwarfed by the offers from other Great Powers- namely China. China’s of-
fers to build pipelines and procure attractive energy trade agreements with Central Asian 
states has taken a lot of business from Russia [10]. 
Instability: Ethnic conflicts, dangerous drug trade, and the spread of radical Islam 
offer a lot to create instability in the region. This has caused all Great Powers to address 
Central Asia with caution. However, the prospect of influence in the geographic location 
and energy trade is too attractive. Accordingly, Central Asian states have used this to their 
advantage and have “elastic” foreign policies [15, p. 297–300]. They tend to form relations 
with a diverse array of states, usually based on whoever fulfills their national interest most 
efficiently. 
Central Asian Anti-Hegemonic Policy: While content with economic relations with 
Russia, the states in the region are wary of becoming neo-colonies to their intimidat-
ing neighbors. Moscow does not want to allot Beijing too much influence on the region; 
however, China’s presence is necessary to offset the power emanating from the US. The US 
must tip-toe around relations with China and Russia in Central Asia if they wish to support 
US foreign policy in Afghanistan. The EU states also desires to access the natural resources 
while also implementing a better system of human rights, but needs China’s presence to 
maintain stability [6, p. 598–599]. In the wake of complex Great Power advances, Central 
Asian states have found advantages in adopting “elastic” or “multi-vectoral” foreign policy. 
In the early years of the independence of Central Asian countries, the Soviet past was 
considered as the history of the oppression, followed by de-Russification. Uzbekistan is a 
great example of this brand of policy. Although a relatively newly formed state, Uzbekistan 
has placed upmost importance on their independence, sovereignty, stability, and develop-
ment. Their ambiguous alignment has protected them from entrapment and abandon-
ment [15, p. 304]. At the same time, Central Asia was searching for a way to integrating to 
the rest of the world. This initiation lighted up new foreign relations with the USA, China, 
and even Turkey. Nevertheless, the role and the existence of Russia has never faded out, 
and Russian identity was looked up for at the same time. Therefore, Moscow was both the 
rival and the model for Central Asia. As a result, but still, Russia falls behind in its ability 
to become a Central Asian hegemon. They lack the means to appease each state’s national 
interests and foster stability. Although they have a good deal of soft power influence on 
the region, the means to establish stability are currently not wielded by any single Great 
Power. This dilemma transforms Central Asia into the new Great Game in international 
relations. 
Also the stability of the Muslims within Russian borders are significant for Moscow. 
By reluctant to see a rise of political Islam in the region, the stability of the Muslims in 
both Central Asia and within its borders have been a critical issue. Even though Central 
Asian countries followed a secular nation building processes, Islam has been an identifier 
of their identity. In fact, Islam does not recognize what modernism embarked societies 
under the name of nations [16]. Caroline Fourest refers to Tariq Ramadan’s words for 
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the Muslims who live in a secular society would compromise their identities moderately. 
However, what he argues is these citizens of secular states with Muslim societies, perceive 
their Muslim identity was coming first [17, p. 377–378]. But indeed, it depends. For in-
stance, in Uzbekistan, secularism is a strong vein, although people prefer defining them-
selves as both Muslim and Uzbek. Uzbek identity comes first by taking it to a secular Islam 
identity [18]. Thereby, if there is no space for nationalism in Islam, modernism finds a 
way to open a place for Islam in nationalism. Having being banned of practicing their re-
ligion under the Soviet rule, Central Asian countries would hesitate of Russian influence. 
Turkey shows up as the balancing power at this point. Although Turkey has not invested 
the region financially because of its lower economic capacity [3], Turkey have become suc-
cessful in investing culturally to the Central Asia through identities and ideologies with-
out underestimating the influence of Russia, by playing the secular model with a Muslim 
society during 2000s. Moscow has been moderate to the role of Ankara in Central Asia for 
its being a bridge between Russia and Central Asia. Moreover, Turkey plays to the moder-
ate Islam leadership for both Central Asian countries and African Muslim countries and 
for some Balkan countries (such as Bosna-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia), 
offering a compromise with Islam and a national identity. However, the fall of the Turkish 
model after the Arab Uprisings [19] and an opening up of the region to the Russian influ-
ence are often discussed. Nevertheless, Russians had to shake hands with Turks to main-
tain the bridge between Russia and Muslim societies, just like Putin did by an opening of 
a central mosque in Moscow with Erdoğan in 2015 [20].
China 
Like Russia, China shares the advantage of geographic proximity and cultural close-
ness with Central Asia. Chinese diplomats have been able to form relationships with re-
gional leaders with greater ease than Americans. This also involves the economic incen-
tives China offers to the region. China aims to invest more in the region while fostering 
stability. They have been relatively successful despite minor tensions in their Xinjiang 
province. 
Chinese Foreign Policy Goals
Unlike Russia and the US, Chinese policy in Central Asia has been predominantly 
business like. Not only is China economically equipped to make attractive deals, it is geo-
graphically close to the region and shares similar cultural values. China’s goals for the 
region include political stability near their borders, hindering competing influences, and 
continuing to promote energy trade [10, p. 603–604]. 
Beijing aims to procure regional stability to protect its economic investments. 
Through the CNPC, China has built pipelines and lasting trade relations with Central 
Asian states since 1997 [7, p. 600]. Announced in 2013, President Xi started the new Silk 
Road policy. It is $ 124 billion project to build transportation infrastructure from China to 
60 other Asian and European countries. The goal is to become an economic superpower 
[21, p. 7]. Central Asia is geographically and economically significant to China. It is a ma-
jor hub among Russia, Europe, and the Middle East and a vital trading partner in natural 
resource extraction. Local policy experts regard China as a ‘crucial power’ [21, p. 7–9]. 
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With such large investment in the region, it is in China’s best interest to maintain sta-
bility. Political instability could mean great economic losses. Chinese strategy for promot-
ing stability has been to develop regional multilateralism and political influence with the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) [22, p.277]. This organization ensures coop-
eration and mutual respect for sovereignty among the participating states. It gives China 
a closer grip on the political situation so they may protect their investments. Separatist 
movements in the Chinese Xinjiang province also jeopardize stability. Filling the area with 
Hans so far has deluded the movement, but it is still a looming concern for the Chinese 
[10, p. 604]. 
Chinese Capabilities
The rapid development and large population of China call for great energy demands. 
China’s number one aim for Central Asia is to benefit from the regional natural fossil 
fuels resources. Promoting development and stability are goals that further support their 
energy objectives [22, p. 277] The SCO has been an effective tool for assuring stability and 
cooperation between Central Asian states, China, and Russia. Although their extensive 
talks have not always been put into action, it serves as a useful communication channel 
between the states [14, p. 2–3]. In fact, the CNPC has been the major actor for Chinese-
Central Asian relations.
CNPC: Major energy related relations with the region began in 1997 when the CNPC 
acquired 60.3 % of stocks from the Kazakhstan Finance Ministry. The transaction has been 
valued at $320 million and set the tone for good business ties between the two states [7, 
p. 599]. In the same year, the CNPC signed a contract with the Kazakhstan Ministry of En-
ergy and Mines. It gave China the development licenses for three oil fields in Kazakhstan. 
Conversation about a pipeline began in 2004 between China and Kazakhstan, while China 
continued to diversify stock purchases with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan [7, p. 599]. The 
China-Kazakhstan Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement was signed in 2005  and exportation 
began as early as 2011. The CNPC also signed natural gas pipeline agreements with Ka-
zakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in 2007 [7, p. 599]. Today, China continues to 
export a majority of the natural resources from Central Asia while maintaining friendly 
diplomatic relations.
One reason the CNPC has been so successful in their experience with the region is 
their incentives. When they sign agreements with Central Asian states, they offer grants, 
engineering resources, and cutting edge innovation [7, p. 599]. Working with China gives 
the region’s states much to gain. Furthermore, China does not pose as a security threat 
like Russia and the US appear to be. Their interests are transparent and offer competitive 
advantages. 
Chinese Challenges 
Compared to Moscow and Washington, Beijing has had fewer setbacks. With the 
absence of military presence, China currently has the best economic hand to influence the 
region. However, Chinese are not without any concerns. Every Great Power approaches 
Central Asia with a wary regard for the instability, which can jeopardize their investments 
tremendously [7, p. 603].
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Despite its economic soft power, China has its concerns. Instability pertaining to sep-
aratist movements in their resource rich Xinjiang province is one of them. The Uighur res-
idents in the area identify themselves with Central Asia more than China. As the Xinjiang 
province possesses valuable natural resources, the Chinese are motivated to be persistent 
in quelling the separatist discourse. Measures include saturating the area with ethnic Hans 
who strong identify as Chinese [10, p. 604]. The area has witnessed many violent episodes 
involving the Uighurs and Chinese. However, the true nature of these episodes- defensive 
or offensive- in unclear due to a lack of objective media sources. The creation of the SCO 
ensures China that the Central Asian states will not defend this ethnic group and further 
safeguards their sovereignty over the province [23, p. 238–249]. 
China has not appreciated US military presence in Central Asia, especially as US and 
NATO personnel have been increasing in number throughout states surrounding China. 
However, China is also concerned about the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan 
and the consequential instability that could ensue. In this regard, US presence in the re-
gion is a double-edged sword wielded by the prominent instability and terrorist rings [22, 
p. 604]. To balance the US and Russia, China has used to SCO to establish multilateral 
cooperation and the CNPC to impose influence in energy trade. 
USA
Washington main interests in Central Asia relates to energy and the war in Afghan-
istan. President Obama employed mainly soft power economic tactics which met with 
both successes and failures. It is difficult to determine the Trump Administration’s Central 
Asian foreign policy goals at this point. Based on his campaign, one can assume that his 
foreign policy may have some isolationist flavors. Unlike China and Russia, the US does 
not enjoy the diplomatic benefits of a common culture and must rely more on economic 
incentives. 
American Foreign Policy Goals
The United States’ role in Central Asia during the twenty-first century has been in 
relation to the war on terrorism. Combatting terrorist networks in Afghanistan has made 
the region a vital supply route for military personnel and equipment [8, p. 631]. To es-
tablish military basses in the area, the US has given subsidies and grants to cooperating 
states [6, p. 84–88]. Their relationship has been a mixed bag of soft and hard power tactics. 
American interests, however, deal with establishing regional security and energy trade. 
Central Asian states have had a difficult time finding stability after their independence. 
Their GDP’s dropped immediately after independence and did not rise again until they 
begin to integrate in global markets in the twenty-first century [8, p. 634]. Consequently, 
diversified energy trade has been a source of balancing and stabilization for the region. 
The more stable the region, the easier it will be for the US to target terrorist organizations 
and prevent them from spreading.
Obama Administration: President Barack Obama’s Administration’s main foreign pol-
icy goals were to create stability and relations friendly enough to allow the use of military 
bases and trade routes. The geographic location of Central Asian states is paramount for 
containing and eradicating terrorist organizations in the Middle East [8, p. 631]. The pro-
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motion of democracy and human rights has been another consistent policy goal for the 
US and other Western actors. 
Obama had called for a reset with Russia at the beginning of his Administration. He 
stressed areas for cooperation like the war in Afghanistan and nonproliferation, while 
cooling relations after the Georgian war. This “reset” policy was the perfect opportunity 
for President Putin to enact the “Putin doctrine” of regaining fallen territory [24, p. 35–
38]. Consequently, Obama’s cooperative efforts with Russian were interpreted as weak. 
Allowing Russia to act aggressively, Crimea was able to be annexed. Despite some bilateral 
efforts to cooperate in Afghanistan, the US and NATO still have troops in post-Soviet ter-
ritory while Russia continues to be assertive in their “near abroad” [24, p. 38–39]. 
Trump Administration: There are unknowns about how President Donald Trump will 
approach the Central Asian region. US-Eurasian relations were not a focal point of his 
campaign. It is possible that Trump’s goals in the region include continuing energy trade, 
fighting terrorism, assist in nuclear nonproliferation, and mending ties with Russia [25, 
p. 38]. Trump’s presidential campaign has also stressed a desire to “reset” relations with 
Moscow. The Russian economy has been harmed by the Obama Administration’s sanc-
tions. Trump has alluded to lifting sanctions and promoting American-Russian business 
relations [25, p. 38]. However, the lifting of sanctions placed on Russia must been done 
delicately as to not appear to be appeasing Putin’s recent aggressive policies. Lifting sanc-
tions placed due to the annexation of Crimea could translate as validation of the aggres-
sive foreign policy. Russia would have incentive to continue such practices [26, p. 50–56].
President Putin has reason to distrust the West after all the economic pressure. How-
ever, in order to regain economic prosperity, relationships with the West are key. Presi-
dent Trump Administration offers an opportunity to mend ties [25, p. 40]. Rex Tillerson, 
Trump’s fist pick as Secretary of State and former CEO of ExxonMobil, had previously 
engaged in a joint-venture with one of Russia’s oil companies: Rosneft. The deal was val-
ued and $723 million and hints at a future with more business and less sanctions with 
Russia [25, p. 38]. Tillerson’s experience in the energy field were useful for future engage-
ments with the region. The main focus of the new Secretary Pompeo, however, has been 
elsewhere so far.
President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is the first leader of Eurasia to per-
sonally contact President Trump. They spoke on the phone November 30th about the fu-
ture of US-Central Asian diplomacy. As Russia’s prime ally, a relationship with Kazakhstan 
will strongly shadow one with the Kremlin [27]. Nazarbayev and Trump spoke about op-
portunities for cooperation, including fighting terrorism and promoting nuclear nonpro-
liferation. The US objective of stopping the spread of terrorist groups in Central Asia and 
the Middle East are aligned with Russia’s [27]. This offers an opportunity for cooperation 
and collaboration with Moscow. The US ambassador to Kazakhstan has stated that there 
is too much to gain from energy trade in the region to dramatically change foreign policy. 
He proposed in early December that Trump’s Administration will continue to promote 
stability, security, and energy trade in Central Asia during the next four years [28]. 
Kazakhstan has received the majority of attention from the US Department of State. 
Other Central Asian states have seldom been mentioned in US foreign policy discourse. 
Tillerson has had several encounters with President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. It is re-
ported that they have had conversations in May about the future of US-Kazakh relations. 
At the 2017 World Expo in Astana, Tillerson delivered a small speech praising his friend-
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ship with Nazarbayev and their strategic partnership [29]. On the surface, their relation-
ship seems to be positive. At the UN Security Council Session, Tillerson talked about 
nuclear nonproliferation, and used Kazakhstan as an example for an excellent nonprolif-
eration policy. Touting their peaceful foreign relations, Tillerson claimed that their efforts 
have made them a member of the “community of nations.” [30]. Based on the positive 
comments Tillerson makes about Kazakhstan, it does not appear that the US-Kazakh re-
lationship will change drastically, even under the new Secretary of State. 
American Capabilities
The Obama Administration utilized more soft power tactics in their relations with 
Central Asia. He aided borders projects, provided infrastructure grants, and gave subsi-
dies to certain groups for the use of trade routes. President Trump’s means to back up his 
policy, on the other hand, are more difficult to discuss so early into his term. 
Obama Administration: The US role in Central Asia has been diverse over Obama’s 
administration. The region is pivotal to the US efforts for the conflicts in the Middle East. 
US foreign policy in Central Asia has been a balanced mix of hard and soft power. Finan-
cial aid to Central Asian states had been used to allow the presence of US air bases to aid 
in the Afghan War up until 2009 [6, p. 84]. This incentive, however, has lost its appeal to 
Russian and Chinese pressure on Central Asian states. Even after receiving a package of 
$30 million to Kyrgyzstan for airspace infrastructure programs, the US was not granted 
permission to retain their air base in Manas [6, p. 84]. The diplomatic strategy of finan-
cial assistance has granted the US access to the Northern Distribution Network. In 2008, 
agreements were made with Uzbekistan that allowed access to Afghan supply routes in 
exchange for a lofty annual payment of $ 500 million [31].
Initially, Tashkent implemented a shift toward the West during Obama’s administra-
tion. In 2010, Uzbekistan not only began the process of dropping out of CSTO, but also left 
EurAsEc. The US was given use of Uzbek airports and infrastructure to transport nonmili-
tary items to help with the Afghan war effort. However, the Uzbek relationships fostered 
at this time seem to be more of a balancing against Russia than aligning with US [6, p. 85].
In Obama Administration earlier years, the US has also sent aid to Tajikistan to recon-
struct borders. In exchange, they were granted access to send goods and troops through 
Tajik territory to Afghanistan. The US has maintained friendly diplomatic relations with 
Kazakhstan, but is economically dwarfed compared to Russian and Chinese relationships 
[6, p. 87–88]. 
Trump Administration: It is possible that President Trump aims to continue energy 
trade, fight terrorism, engage in nuclear proliferation, and improve Russian relations. 
However, these assumptions cannot be taken for granted. George Krol, the US Ambas-
sador to Kazakhstan, has reported no desire from the President to change Central Asian 
foreign policy in December [28]. Nevertheless, Trump Administration policy has so far 
been unpredictable. Balancing Russia and China in the region will be a difficult feat as 
Trump has the reputation as a diplomatic wildcard. As China and Russia are continuing to 
cooperate over energy trade, Trump must be cautious in his relations with Xi Jingping and 
Putin [32]. If President Trump wants to continue the Obama Administration’s foreign pol-
icy goals for the region, he will have to utilize the soft power tactics used before him [32]. 
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2019. Т. 12. Вып. 1 17
It has been reported in March that Trump desires to cut the Department of State 
funding by 37 %. His strategy is to cut the inflow of money to the UN, 20 % of which de-
rives from the US. Furthermore, Trump’s budget proposal included $54 billion increase 
of defense spending [33]. This shift from soft to hard power has potential to upset many 
delicate diplomatic balances that President Obama established. For example, the survival 
of the JPCOA (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) about Iran was in question. Re-
cently, President Trump declared withdrawal from JPCOA which changes the security cal-
culations in the whole region. This also emphasizes that the new US President has stressed 
the importance of hard power over soft ones. 
American Challenges
The Obama Administration faced competition from China and Russia in its Central 
Asian pursuits. While economic incentives have been effective as a soft power tactic, Rus-
sia and China have enjoyed the benefits of geographic and cultural commonalities, as 
mentioned earlier. 
Obama’s Setbacks: The economic crisis of 2008  was a major setback to US foreign 
policy. Budget deficits restricted the US from making as many friendly transactions with 
the Central Asians as China had. The economic packages the US was able to provide to 
the Central Asian leaders were easily overshadowed by Chinese bids [31]. The US had to 
compete with trade offers from China and Russia who were not only financially influen-
tial, but also held key geographic and cultural advantages (American Foreign Policy). The 
Obama Administration’s main objectives in the region were to establish enough stability 
to allow supply routes to Afghanistan, develop energy trade, promote human rights and 
democratic ideals, and prevent state failure [6, p. 90]. 
While it may seem impossible for the US to be a major regional influence, Wash-
ington can offset the influence of Russia. With more assertive Russian policy in places 
like the Ukraine and Georgia, Central Asian states are increasingly more cautious with 
Moscow. Additionally, the national interests of the Central Asians are not entirely aligned 
with those of Russians [34, p. 165–166]. Consequently, US has the valuable advantage of 
being an actor able to balance Russian role in the region. The Magnitsky Act of 2012 was 
a bilateral effort to sanction Russian officials after lawyer Sergei Magnitsky was arrested 
and killed in jail [25, p. 38]. After the annexation of Crimea, the Obama Administration’s 
sanctioned Russia further. It has been detrimental to the Russian economy, as ordinary 
Russian citizens make only 87 % of what they used to make before the sanctions in August 
of 2014 [35, p. 7]. 
III. CONCERNS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Russia, China, and the US have distinct goals for Central Asia. However, their con-
cerns are also aligned. The instability of the region threatens each Great Power’s goals. Of 
course, external sources of threats are concerns for these new republics. Yet, the internal 
sources of threats seem to be more significant. In fact, the Great Powers agree that radical 
groups, political instability, and trafficking are the most critical internal threats in Central 
Asia.
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Radical Groups
Central Asian states embrace a dichotomy of majority Muslim population with a 
staunch secularist policy. Furthermore, in a survey conducted in 2009, researchers found 
that 61 % of Central Asian Muslims did not support the idea of international Islamic soli-
darity [36, p. 306]. Most of the region’s Muslims also do not adhere to all five pillars of the 
faith. The strictest of Muslims tend to be academically educated and fall within the age 
range of 17–30  [36, 308–318]. However, the small percentage of radical Muslims have 
prompted the local governments to be extremely secular. 
The Muslim faith in Central Asia has had roots in the 7th century. It became quite 
popular in the Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan territories during the Soviet rule. 
202 out of the 495 Soviet mosques were in Uzbek land during the 1950’s [37, p. 176]. How-
ever, during the Brezhnev rule, underground radical movements began to take root in Ta-
jik and Uzbek communities as the religion was being eradicated by the Soviet-Communist 
rule. As they became persecuted by the state, they began practicing a version of Islam 
similar to the radical Wahhabi brand. In turn, trying to combat and quell the movement 
has only propelled it [37, p. 178]. The constant battle between quieting radical groups and 
hindering their growth has been a self-promoting problem. 
Central Asian states have faced clashes of ethnic and religious identity since their 
independence. In Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks in the South have felt underrepresented and 
have subsequently mobilized themselves in 2010 [38, p. 21–24]. Kyrgyz are quick to blame 
their violence on the spread of radical Islam and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (ex-
tremist organization, prohibited in Russia) (IMU). Omelicheva proposes that the oppres-
sion of minorities has led to the spread of radical Islam. Persecuting ethnic and religious 
groups have forced them to develop underground movements and become defensive [37, 
p. 169]. The IMU has been described as a jihadist movement without major Islamic prin-
ciples. There have been no aims at conversion or spreading the religion. Their goals in 
the twenty first century have been to gain power [37, p. 169]. Radical Islamic groups in 
Central Asia are mainly compromised of ethnically persecuted groups like the Uzbeks 
and Tajiks. While some like to contend that socioeconomic and political factors have led 
to radicalization, the radical Muslims in the region are well educated, urban dwelling in-
dividuals [37, p. 172]. Radical groups threaten the security and stability of Central Asian 
states and are a major deterrent to Great Powers from investing too much in the region. 
Political Instability
The political institutions in the region are acting on a delicate balance of corruption 
and multilateral relations with powerful actors. Not only are foreign relations fragile, but 
multilateral regional relationships are currently based on rivalry and distrust. 
Regional level: The allocation of water resources throughout the region is an example 
of leading to instability. Of course, water is not only vital for basic human needs and en-
ergy, but also for irrigation of crops and raising animals upon which many communities 
rely. For example, water is crucial for cotton growth in Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Val-
ley [39, p. 1]. The Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers account for 90 % of the regions river 
water and 75 % of all water needed for agriculture. Kyrgyzstan controls a vast amount 
of the rivers, while Tajikistan has holding in the agro needs, leaving Uzbekistan at the 
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mercy of other powers [39, p. 2]. The Ferghana Valley is where these water sources and 
countries connect and clash. The borders have been disputed multiple times from 2010 to 
present day, leaving a trail of many deaths, hostages, injuries, and account of arson and 
property damage in its wake. Furthermore, the lack of water for communities propels civil 
unrest and promotes instability through violent clashes [39, p. 11]. These ethnic clashes 
have more to do with resources than ethnicity. Thus, this is a typical example of resource 
conflicts. 
State level: Political stability within Central Asian states shadowed by corruption, 
mafia networks, ethnic clashes, and illegal precedence. These states have not completely 
embraced the notion of a democracy since their creation. Considering their authoritarian 
leaders as legends who saved their country, citizens could not challenge their policies or 
expect free and fair elections [40, p. 138]. Nevertheless, these authoritarians have provided 
stability in the region. The most concerning issue is the forthcoming transfers of power, 
especially in Kazakhstan. The current President, Nazarbayev, has reigned since 1990 and 
is growing old. The Kazakh constitution allows for a temporary succession plan if the 
president is abruptly unable to rule, but there are no means nor precedent to establish a 
permanent president [40, p. 143]. Furthermore, this is an unspoken rule that ambitious ac-
tions have consequences. Rahat Aliev, the president’s son in law, was vocal about his plans 
to run for election and was forced to leave Kazakhstan in 2007 [39, p. 144]. Uzbekistan also 
shares the custom of keeping ambitions hidden. The next ruler of Kazakhstan would also 
need Russia’s silent blessing. Nazarbayev has been vital to helping the Kremlin carry out 
their economic community goals for Central Asia [40, p. 145]. 
There is a multi-tiered system of threats to stability in the region that will take years to 
resolve. The states themselves, their relationships with one another, and their relationships 
with the Great Powers are all currently vulnerable to conflict. 
Drug Trafficking
Central Asia’s geographic location makes regional security vulnerable to illicit trad-
ing. Afghanistan to the South has the world’s largest poppy farms while Russia to the 
North has the world’s worse opium addiction [41, p. 1235]. Illegal drug trade has become 
a large financial resource for terrorist groups. In the aftermath of 9/11, the West has made 
great efforts to quell terrorist groups and their hands in the drug trade in Afghanistan. 
Today, the majority of illicit trade is conducted on a mafia-state nexus [41, p. 1236–1237]. 
The collapse of the USSR allowed criminal syndicates in the region to take advantage 
of the insufficient border control. Since the 1980’s, opium production in Afghanistan has 
increased 5 times. In 2010, roughly a quarter of all Afghan heroin ended up in Russia. That 
is essentially 90 metric tons of heroin being trafficked through Central Asia [41, p. 1237]. 
The trade is managed by regional mafias who also deal with trafficking cannabis, humans, 
and arms. Nowadays, heroin is their most lucrative product in the region. The local mafia 
has specialized in its trade since the 1980’s and is associated with powerful businessmen 
and political elites [41, p. 1237–1238]. The mafia-state relationships are interdependent 
and mutually beneficial. The mafia-state connection is an exchange of favors where mafias 
are offered immunity for a percentage of this trade profits. For this reason, there is little vi-
olence involved in illicit trafficking [41, p. 1238]. Mafias also feel no need to engage in turf 
wars as the competition is not harsh. While actors outside the region continue to deal with 
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the terrorist drug related networks, the Central Asian mafias act with little risk of abolish-
ment [41, p. 1238]. If Russia, China, and/or the US desire to tackle the drug trade issue, 
they would have to jeopardize destabilizing well established mafia-state relationships.
Future Prospects
Although not all Great Powers have approached the region in the same way, there is a 
substantial window for future cooperation. Russia, China, and the US have similar policy 
goals for political stability, containment of radical Islam, and prevention of trafficking. All 
pursue an open door foreign policy with Central Asians. Areas where the Great Powers 
differ include the favorite types of political system: authoritarian or democracy. Russia 
and China have no problem building relationships with authoritarian leaders, while the 
US prefer to promote and establish a democratic political system. However, these differ-
ences do not need to impede a multilateral effort to eradicate political Islam and illegal 
trafficking. Cooperative diplomacy amidst the Great Powers can be utilized to address 
these concerns and manage their challenges in the twenty first century. Therefore, the 
story of the Great Powers in Central Asia does not need to end sadly.
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